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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAMIE BACON, * 
* Court of Appeals Case No. 
Petitioner/Appellant, * 920274-CA 
* 
vs. * 
* 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE * 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF * Priority No. 7 
UTAH; INTERMOUNTAIN POWER * 
SERVICE CORPORATION; and * 
WAUSAU INSURANCE COMPANIES * Industrial Commission 
* Case No. 91001038 
Defendants/Appellees. * 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(a) (1990) and Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-86 (1988). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether Jamie Bacon's appeal must be dismissed in its 
entirety because the issues addressed in her brief were never 
preserved for appeal: The appellate issues advanced by Ms. Bacon 
were never brought to the attention of the Industrial Commission 
and have been asserted for the first time on appeal. 
2. Whether the administrative law judge and the Utah 
Industrial Commission acted appropriately in dismissing Ms. 
Bacon's claim with prejudice because Ms. Bacon and her attorney 
wholly failed to cooperate in discovery, neglected to respond to 
defense motions, and ignored the Industrial Commission's direct 
Order calling for the applicant to file an amended pleading 
specifying the factual basis of her industrial accident. 
3. Whether Utah's "Open Courts" constitutional provision 
guarantees that a worker's compensation claim can never be 
dismissed with prejudice. 
4. Whether the United States and Utah Constitutions 
guarantee effective assistance of counsel in non-criminal cases. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Two standards of review are pertinent to Ms. Bacon's appeal: 
1. As a threshold matter, the Utah Court of Appeals must 
determine whether any of the issues addressed in appellant's 
brief have been preserved for appellate consideration. This 
inquiry is governed by Pease v. Industrial Commission, 694 P.2d 
613 (Utah 1984) and Johnson v. Department of Employment Security, 
782 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 1989) which hold that all issues (even 
constitutional issues) which are not raised during the 
administrative proceedings below cannot be asserted for the first 
time on appeal. 
2. An examination of the merits of Ms. Bacon's appeal will 
focus on the narrow inquiry of whether the Industrial Commission 
acted appropriately in upholding the sanction of a dismissal with 
prejudice. The propriety of such a dismissal is governed by an 
abuse of discretion standard of review, since trial courts are 
2 
afforded broad deference in conducting discovery matters and 
imposing sanctions for non-compliance with their orders and 
procedures. See, W. W. & W. B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West 
Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah 1977); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. 
Murray First Thrift & Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1975); Sheid 
v. Hewlett Packard, 826 P.2d 396 (Colo. App. 1991). 
The standards for review cited in appellant's brief have 
nothing to do with this appeal because: (1) there was no "fact 
finding" entered below which the Utah Court of Appeals is called 
upon to review, and (2) no interpretation of any statute or 
constitutional provision was ever involved at any stage of the 
proceedings below. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The statutory and administrative procedural provisions 
governing this appeal (assuming that the Utah Court of Appeals 
rules that the issues contained in the appellant's brief have 
somehow been preserved for appeal) are the following: 
1. Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(attached hereto as Addendum "A"); 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (attached as Addendum "B"); and 
3. Industrial Commission Procedural Rule R490-1-4 (attached 
hereto as Addendum "C"). 
3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below. 
Ms. Bacon claims she is entitled to worker's compensation 
benefits for an alleged January 17, 1991 industrial accident. 
At the time she signed and filed her Application for Hearing, 
Ms. Bacon (and her counsel) left the factual allegations section 
of the Application completely blank. Ms. Bacon and her attorney 
subsequently failed to respond to the defendants' Interrogatories 
and Motion for a More Definite Statement. Ms. Bacon and her 
attorney also failed to comply with an Industrial Commission 
Order which directed the applicant to file an Amended Application 
for Hearing. In the Amended Application (which was never filed), 
Ms. Bacon was to have specified the factual basis for her alleged 
industrial injury. Due to Ms. Bacon's failure to comply with the 
Industrial Commission Order, and given her general failure to 
prosecute her claim, the administrative law judge assigned to the 
case finally dismissed the Application for Hearing after a 
properly filed Motion to Dismiss had been submitted by the 
defendants. 
Ms. Bacon and her attorney filed a Motion for Review with 
the Industrial Commission seeking a reversal of the 
administrative law judge's dismissal with prejudice. In her 
Motion, Ms. Bacon indicated that her condition of anxiety had 
precluded her from assisting her attorney in answering the 
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defendants' Interrogatories in a timely manner. The Motion for 
Review did not specify why the applicant and her attorney had not 
been able to respond to the Interrogatories for over four months, 
nor did the Motion for Review offer any suggestion as to why the 
administrative law judge's Order requiring the filing of a more 
definite statement had not been complied with. After considering 
the applicant's Motion for Review, the Utah Industrial Commission 
affirmed the dismissal with prejudice. 
Ms. Bacon has now filed this appeal, contending that the 
administrative law judge and the Industrial Commission erred in 
dismissing her claim with prejudice. However, Ms. Bacon's 
appellate brief addresses, for the first time on appeal, issues 
which were not raised at any stage of the Industrial Commission 
proceedings below. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The above-captioned matter arises from an industrial 
accident which allegedly occurred on January 17, 1991. (R. 
13.J1 Jamie Bacon, with the assistance of her counsel, filed 
her Industrial Commission Application for Hearing on April 16, 
1991. (R. 13.) The Application, signed by both Ms. Bacon and 
her attorney, was (and is) incomplete. (See, Addendum ffD.fl) 
Paragraph 2 of the one-page Application form, which requires a 
"R. 13" refers the Court to page 13 of the Record on Appeal. 
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description of the alleged industrial accident, was left blank by 
Ms. Bacon and her attorney. (R. 13.) At the bottom of the 
Application form, the following warning is posted in bold text: 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL BE RETURNED 
SIGNATURES CERTIFY READING OF INSTRUCTIONS 
ON REVERSE SIDE OF THIS FORM 
Ms. Bacon's Application for Hearing was submitted to 
defendants on October 15, 1991. (R. 33.) On November 14, 1991, 
defendants answered the Application. (R. 44-46.) In addition, 
defendants served Ms. Bacon's counsel with a Motion for More 
Definite Statement due to the complete absence of a description 
of the alleged industrial accident in paragraph 2 of the 
Application. (R. 41-43.) Interrogatories were also served upon 
counsel on November 14, 1991. (R. 34-40.) On November 22, 1991, 
Administrative* Law Judge Timothy Allen issued a letter ordering 
Ms. Bacon and her attorney to file a more definite statement 
regarding the purported accident. (R. 47.) (See a copy of the 
letter attached as Addendum "E.") The letter was mailed both to 
Ms. Bacon and to her attorney. (Id.) 
Ms. Bacon and her attorney ignored Judge Allen's Order and 
further failed to respond to defendants' Interrogatories which 
should have been answered no later than December 17, 1991. On 
January 15, 1992, defendants' counsel sent a letter to 
applicant's counsel advising that the Interrogatories must be 
responded to within a week or a motion to dismiss would be filed. 
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(R. 48.) After applicant ignored this request, defendants filed 
a Motion to Dismiss the Application for Hearing on February 6, 
1992. (R. 82-85.) Applicant made no attempt to respond to this 
Motion. The Motion to Dismiss was granted by Judge Allen on 
February 13, 1992 dismissing the Application with prejudice for 
failure to state a definite claim as required by the Order issued 
November 22, 1991. (R. 86.) 
Ms. Bacon filed her Industrial Commission Motion for Review 
seeking reversal of the dismissal on March 9, 1992. (R. 87-90.) 
The Motion argues that applicant's counsel had faced a good deal 
of difficulty in obtaining "the necessary recital of facts from 
the applicant." (R. 87.) (See a copy of the Motion attached as 
Addendum "F.") The Motion is supported by a letter, written by 
Ms. Bacon, which states that her attempts to consider answers to 
the Interrogatories had provoked a "two-day anxiety attack." 
(R. 91.) No satisfactory explanation is offered in the Motion as 
to why the Interrogatories could not have been answered in the 
nearly four months since they had been served. Further, no 
explanation is given as to why it was not possible for Ms. Bacon 
or her attorney to respond to Judge Allen's Order to provide a 
more definite statement (or even any statement at all) regarding 
the purported accident. 
Subsequently, on March 23, 1992, Ms. Bacon filed Answers to 
Interrogatories notwithstanding the fact that this case had been 
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dismissed. Ms. Bacon has still made no effort to comply with 
Judge Allen's Order requiring a more definite statement. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellees contend that Ms. Bacon's appeal should be denied 
in its entirety because the three issues addressed in her 
appellate brief were never raised at any stage of the proceedings 
below. In her Motion for Review filed with the Industrial 
Commission, Ms. Bacon simply argued that she and her attorney had 
attempted to answer the defendants' Interrogatories and that any 
delay in conducting and prosecuting her case was essentially due 
to excusable neglect. This Motion for Review argument is not 
remotely similar to the three arguments advanced by Ms. Bacon on 
appeal. Accordingly, pursuant to well-settled Utah case law, 
this Court should reject the arguments advanced by Ms. Bacon in 
her brief because each of the issues in the brief has been raised 
for the first time on appeal. 
Even if this Court chooses to decide any of the three issues 
raised by Ms. Bacon, her appeal still fails. Each of Ms. Bacon's 
three appellate issues clearly lack merit. 
Ms. Bacon first contends that the administrative law judge 
and the Industrial Commission committed reversible error by 
dismissing her claim with prejudice. Quite to the contrary, 
utilizing its broad discretion to govern discovery proceedings 
and to sanction litigants for failing to comply with orders 
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issued during those proceedings, the Industrial Commission 
properly dismissed Ms. Bacon's claim. The dismissal with 
prejudice was entered only after Ms. Bacon and her attorney had 
(1) signed and filed the Application for Hearing without 
specifying any factual basis for the alleged industrial injury; 
(2) failed to respond to the defendants' Interrogatories; (3) 
failed to respond to the defendants' Motion for a More Definite 
Statement; (4) failed to comply with the administrative law 
judge's Order calling for the filing of an Amended Application 
for Hearing setting forth a more definite statement as to the 
nature of the alleged industrial accident; and (5) failed to 
respond to defendants' Motion to Dismiss. This course of 
misconduct and failure to prosecute her claim provides an ample 
basis for sustaining the dismissal with prejudice entered below. 
Ms. Bacon next contends that the dismissal with prejudice 
deprived her of her constitutionally guaranteed access to open 
courts. Nothing could be further from the truth. Ms. Bacon was 
properly permitted the opportunity to file her Application 
pursuant to the legislatively mandated provisions of Utah's 
Workers' Compensation Act. Due to her own inactivity and failure 
to comply with the Industrial Commission's Order demanding the 
filing of a more definite statement, Ms. Bacon effectively 
forfeited her right to proceed with her workers' compensation 
claim. A litigant who has effectively forfeited her right to 
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pursue a remedy in Utah's open courts has absolutely no reasoned 
basis to contend that the sanctions she has brought upon herself 
somehow violate her constitutionally guaranteed access to open 
courts. 
Finally, Ms. Bacon contends that the dismissal with 
prejudice entered against her should be set aside because it 
derived solely from the ineffective assistance of her workers' 
compensation counsel. Again, Ms. Bacon is incorrect. Utah does 
not recognize a Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of 
counsel in civil and administrative proceedings. Furthermore, 
even if Ms. Bacon's ineffective assistance argument can be 
accorded any legal legitimacy, it is clear (as a factual matter) 
that Ms. Bacon's own inaction produced the dismissal with 
prejudice. At the time she signed her Application for Hearing, 
Ms. Bacon had an obligation to read the one-page form and ensure 
that the very minimal information requested on the form was 
complete and accurate. Despite the ease with which the one-page 
Application for Hearing can be filled out, Ms. Bacon simply chose 
to leave paragraph 2 of the form blank and, accordingly, provided 
neither the Industrial Commission nor the defendants with any 
clue as to the nature of her industrial accident. Further, Ms. 
Bacon's alleged two-day anxiety attack with respect to 
defendants' Interrogatories cannot possibly justify total 
inactivity on the part of Ms. Bacon and her attorney for over 
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four months. Indeed, the Interrogatory responses were never 
submitted to the defendants until after Ms, Bacon's claim had 
been dismissed with prejudice. Finally, Ms. Bacon made no 
attempt to comply with the Industrial Commission Court Order 
requiring her to file an Amended Application for Hearing setting 
forth a definite statement as to the nature of her industrial 
accident. This court Order was mailed directly to Ms. Bacon, but 
she made no attempt to communicate with the Industrial 
Commission. The failure to prosecute her claim appears to have 
arisen largely from her own anxiety and indolence. Accordingly, 
Ms. Bacon has no basis for requesting a reversal of the 
Industrial Commission's dismissal with prejudice. 
Throughout her brief, Ms. Bacon laments that she will be 
left with no recourse should the Utah Court of Appeals uphold the 
dismissal with prejudice entered below. Ms. Bacon and her 
appellate counsel know that this is not true. Based upon her 
numerous allegations regarding her former counsel's misconduct, 
Ms. Bacon can certainly pursue other remedies against that 
attorney. For all of the foregoing reasons, Ms. Bacon's request 
for appellate relief should be denied. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JAMIE BACON'S APPEAL MUST BE DISMISSED IN ITS ENTIRETY 
BECAUSE THE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN HER BRIEF WERE NEVER 
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL: THE APPELLATE ISSUES ADVANCED BY 
MS, BACON WERE NEVER BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION AND HAVE BEEN 
ASSERTED FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL 
The issues addressed in appellant's brief were never raised 
at any stage of the Industrial Commission proceedings below. 
Accordingly, those issues cannot now be advanced and addressed 
for the first time on appeal. Pease v. Industrial Commission, 
694 P.2d 613 (Utah 1984) (petitioner has the responsibility to 
raise all issues that could be presented at the time, including 
constitutional issues, for the issues to be preserved for 
appeal); American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1 (Utah 1984); 
U.S.X. Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 781 P.2d 883, (Utah App. 
1989); Ring v. Industrial Commission, 744 P.2d 602 (Utah App. 
1987); Johnson v. Dept. of Emp. Security, 782 P.2d 965 (Utah App. 
1989). 
The Industrial Commission Motion for Review filed by Ms. 
Bacon and her attorney raised only one argument,, In a nutshell, 
Ms. Bacon contended that her claim should not be dismissed 
because she and her attorney had been doing the best they could 
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to answer the defendants' Interrogatories.2 This "due 
diligence" or "excusable neglect" argument is not now one of the 
issues raised by Ms. Bacon on appeal. Indeed, not one of the 
three issues raised by Ms. Bacon in her appellate brief was 
included in her Industrial Commission Motion for Review. 
Accordingly, none of the issues Ms. Bacon has chosen to brief has 
been preserved for appeal. As this Court observed in Johnson, 
supra: 
We do not consider issues raised for the 
first time on appeal. Rekward v. Industrial 
Commission, 755 P.2d 166, 168 (Utah App. 
1988). This general rule applies to 
constitutional issues first raised on appeal 
as well as to other issues. . . . [Citations 
omitted.] 
For the foregoing reason, Ms. Bacon's Request for appellate 
relief must be denied. 
2As indicated in the Statement of Facts above, the Motion for 
Review failed to adequately explain why the Interrogatories had not 
been answered in over four months. The Motion for Review also 
failed to address why neither Ms. Bacon nor her attorney had 
attempted to respond to Judge Allen's Order calling for the filing 
of a more definite statement. 
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POINT II 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AND THE UTAH INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION ACTED APPROPRIATELY IN DISMISSING MS. BACON'S 
CLAIM WITH PREJUDICE BECAUSE MS. BACON AND HER ATTORNEY WHOLLY 
FAILED TO COOPERATE IN DISCOVERY, NEGLECTED TO RESPOND TO 
DEFENSE MOTIONS, AND IGNORED THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION'S 
DIRECT ORDER CALLING FOR THE APPLICANT TO FILE 
AN AMENDED PLEADING SETTING FORTH THE 
NATURE OF HER INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT 
It is well settled in this state and in every other 
jurisdiction in the country that dismissal of a Complaint with 
prejudice is an appropriate sanction when a party (like Ms. Bacon 
in the present case) fails to cooperate in discovery, fails to 
generally prosecute her claim, and fails to abide by a direct 
Court Order which calls for the filing of an amended pleading. 
Ms. Bacon and her attorney committed each of the aforesaid acts 
during the pendency of the Industrial Commission proceedings 
below. 
As outlined in the Statement of Facts on pages 5 through 7 
of this Brief, Ms. Bacon and her attorney failed to file any 
response to the defendants' Motion for a More Definite Statement 
filed concurrently with the defendants' Answer. Further, Ms. 
Bacon and her attorney failed to answer the defendants' 
Interrogatories, which were also filed concurrently with 
defendants' Answer, until after Ms. Bacon's worker's compensation 
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claim had been dismissed with prejudice. To compound their 
problems, Ms. Bacon and her attorney then completely failed to 
respond to Administrative Law Judge Allen's November 22, 1991 
letter which expressly requested that the applicant file an 
amended pleading setting forth a description of her alleged 
industrial accident. It should be highlighted that Judge Allen's 
letter calling for the filing of a more definite statement was 
sent to both Ms. Bacon and her attorney. Having received no 
response to Judge Allen's request for an amended pleading, 
defense counsel sent a letter dated January 15, 1992 requesting 
that Ms. Bacon submit her overdue response to the defendants' 
first set of Interrogatories. This letter also cautioned that a 
Motion to Dismiss would be filed by the defendants in the event 
the Interrogatories were not responded to in a timely manner. 
Subsequently, on February 6, 1992, the defendants filed 
their Motion to Dismiss because the applicant and her attorney 
had taken absolutely no action to move the worker's compensation 
claim forward. Neither the applicant nor her attorney filed any 
response to the Motion to Dismiss. Finally, on February 13, 
1992, the administrative law judge reviewed Ms. Bacon's course of 
conduct, weighed that conduct against Ms. Bacon's countervailing 
3In her Motion for Review (R. 87) , Ms. Bacon suggests that her 
"two-day anxiety attack" explains why the defendants' 
Interrogatories were not answered prior to the dismissal of her 
claim. 
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right to have her claim heard on the merits, and judiciously 
entered an Order dismissing Ms, Bacon's claim with prejudice. 
Given the totality of the circumstances surrounding Ms. 
Bacon's failure to prosecute her Industrial Commission claim, and 
given her failure to respond to Judge Allen's November 22, 1991 
Order (which was sent directly to the applicant herself), the 
Industrial Commission acted properly in dismissing Ms. Bacon's 
claim with prejudice. While such a dismissal is often viewed by 
the Courts as a measure of last resort, the inaction of Ms. Bacon 
and her attorney warrant the dismissal upheld by the Industrial 
Commission. 
Both the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals 
have upheld prejudicial dismissals of Complaints in cases similar 
to the present one. In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 
410 (Utah 1964), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the striking of a 
defendant's answer and the entry of judgment against that 
defendant where the defendant failed to comply with the pre-trial 
discovery order entered by the court. Similarly, in Arnica Mutual 
Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah App. 1989), this Court 
upheld a default judgment entered against a party who (even 
though not in violation of a court order) had "simply refused to 
cooperate in discovery." id. at 962. 
Consistent with Utah's case precedent, courts around the 
country have upheld prejudicial dismissals of workers' 
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compensation claims in fact situations similar to the present 
case. In Loosev v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 744 S.W.2d 402 
(Ark. App. 1988), the Arkansas Court of Appeals held that an 
administrative law judge had appropriately dismissed a worker's 
compensation claim with prejudice due to the worker's failure to 
comply with an Industrial Commission discovery Order. In Loosey, 
the Industrial Commission administrative law judge established a 
date by which discovery was to be accomplished by the parties. 
When the applicant failed to respond to the defendants7 
Interrogatories within the permitted time, the administrative law 
judge dismissed the applicant's claim with prejudice. The 
Arkansas Court of Appeals upheld the administrative law judge's 
dismissal on the grounds that Rule 37(d) of the Arkansas Rules of 
Civil Procedure (which is identical to Rule 37(d) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure) permits dismissal as a sanction in the 
event that a party disobeys a Court discovery Order.4 
Similarly, appellate courts have upheld the dismissal with 
prejudice of workers' compensation claims in the following cases: 
Sheid v. Hewlett Packard, 826 P.2d 396 (Colo. App. 1991) 
(dismissal was proper due to claimant's failure to abide by an 
4The Court of Appeals should keep in mind that Utah's Rules of 
Civil Procedure can be, and routinely are, invoked at the 
discretion of Industrial Commission administrative law judges. 
See, Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88 (1965) and Industrial Commission Rule 
R490-1-4(N) which provides that "the Industrial Commission shall 
generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding 
discovery and the issuance of subpoenas . . . ." 
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Industrial Commission discovery order); Mershon v. Oreaonian 
Pub., 772 P.2d 440 (Or. App. 1989); Liggett v. State Indus. Ins. 
System, 661 P.2d 882 (Nev. 1983); Iafornaro v. Charter Builders, 
557 So.2d 898 (Fl. App. 1990); Martin v. The South Coast Corp., 
356 So.2d 500 (La. App. 1977); Smith v. Ballou, Johnson & Nichols 
Co., 437 A.2d 1090 (R.I. 1981); Regal Wood Products, Inc. v. 
Mendez, 432 So.2d 141 (Fl. App. 1983) (where the applicant made 
no showing of good cause for failure to prosecute, his workers' 
compensation claim had to be dismissed); Roberts v. Indus. 
Commission, 451 N.E. 2d 857 (111. 1983) (dismissal for lack of 
prosecution of claim was within the sound discretion of the 
Industrial Commission); Overstreet v. Home Indemnity Co., 747 
S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App. 1987) (lower court did not abuse its 
discretion when it dismissed claimant's action v/ith prejudice due 
to claimant's failure to comply with a court discovery order); 
Notman v. Indus. Commission, 579 N.E.2d 370 (111. App. 1991) 
(Industrial Commission has inherent authority to dismiss a claim 
due to claimant's failure to comply with an order requiring 
disclosure of income tax returns). 
The facts of the present case and the facts of the Loosey 
case (cited on page 17 above) are indistinguishable, with the 
exception that Ms. Bacon's failure to cooperate in the discovery 
process and failure to abide by an express Industrial Commission 
Order are more egregious than the delay committed by the 
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applicant in Loosey. On the basis of the well-settled law in 
this and other jurisdictions, the dismissal of Ms. Bacon's claim 
should be affirmed by the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The dismissal with prejudice upheld by the Industrial 
Commission is sanctioned not only by the case law cited above, 
but also by the rules of procedure governing practice before the 
Commission. (See, f.n. 4, supra.) Under the Utah Industrial 
Commission Rules in effect at the time Ms. Bacon filed her 
Application in this case, the Commission and its administrative 
law judges governed discovery proceedings according to the 
following general provision: 
R490-1-4. Pleadings and Discovery. 
H. Upon filing the Answer, the defendant may 
commence discovery with appropriate sets of 
interrogatories. . . . Failure of an 
applicant to comply with [defendants' 
discovery] request may result in the 
dismissal of a claim . . . . 
This provision, particularly when read in light of Rule 
37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, expressly sanctions 
the dismissal with prejudice entered by the administrate law 
judge and upheld by the Industrial Commission. The 
administrative law judge and the Industrial Commission acted 
appropriately and within the bounds of the Rules of Civil 
Procedure in dismissing Ms. Bacon's claim with prejudice due to 
her failure to participate in discovery and especially due to her 
failure to abide by or even respond to the express Order of the 
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Industrial Commission calling for the filing of an amended 
pleading setting forth a definite statement as to the nature of 
her alleged industrial claim. The propriety of the dismissal 
with prejudice is particularly evident, and should be affirmed by 
this Court, because Rule 37(d) vests trial courts with broad 
discretionary power to dismiss claims when a party disobeys a 
court order or refuses to cooperate in the discovery process. 
See, W.W. & W..B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc. , 568 
P.2d 734 (Utah 1977); G. M. Leasing Corp. v. Murray First Thrift 
& Loan Co., 534 P.2d 1244 (Utah 1976); Sheid v. Hewlett Packard, 
826 P.2d 396 (Colo. App. 1991); and Loosey v. Osmose Wood 
Preserving Co., 744 S.W.2d 402 (Ark. App. 1988). 
Ms. Bacon argues that the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in 
Doubletree, Inc. v. Industrial Commission, 797 P.2d 464 (Utah 
App. 1990) somehow demonstrates that the Industrial Commission 
committed error in upholding the administrative law judge's 
dismissal with prejudice. The applicant's reliance upon 
Doubletree is completely misplaced. The Doubletree opinion 
contains a very narrow holding. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Orme simply specified in Doubletree that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46(b)-3(3)(d) (1989) of the Utah Administrative Procedures 
Act permits the Industrial Commission to dismiss a worker's 
compensation claim without prejudice. However, the Doubletree 
opinion does not suggest that the Industrial Commission is 
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without power to also dismiss workers' compensation claims with 
prejudice. Indeed, the Doubletree holding cannot be extended 
this far in light of Rule 37(d) and the foregoing case law 
analysis contained in appellees' brief. Accordingly, the 
Doubletree opinion has no precedential effect in the context of 
Ms. Bacon's appeal. 
Ms. Bacon also contends that Bonneville Tower Condominium 
Management Committee v. Thompson Miche Assoc., 728 P.2d 1017 
(Utah 1986) somehow demonstrates that the Industrial Commission 
erred in dismissing her worker's compensation claim with 
prejudice. Again, Ms. Bacon is mistaken. Bonneville Tower 
analyzes the propriety of dismissing a claim for failure to join 
an indispensable party. The dismissal reviewed in Bonneville 
Tower has nothing to do with a party's failure to prosecute her 
claim, failure to cooperate in discovery or failure to abide by a 
court Order. Accordingly, the facts and holding of Bonneville 
Tower are entirely inapposite in the context of the present 
appeal. 
Ms. Bacon also argues in Point I of her appellate brief that 
the administrative law judge and Industrial Commission below 
somehow erred in determining that Ms. Bacon's Application for 
Hearing could not sustain an award on her behalf "under any set 
of facts which could be proved in support of [her] claim." (See 
p. 11 of Ms. Bacon's Utah Court of Appeals Brief.) Ms. Bacon's 
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assignment of error in this regard lacks merit for two reasons. 
First, by examining Ms. Bacon's Application for Hearing (attached 
hereto as Addendum "D"), the Court will observe that paragraph 2 
of the Application flatly fails to advance any state of facts in 
support of the requested worker's compensation award. 
Accordingly, the administrative law judge and the Industrial 
Commission could not examine the potential merits of Ms. Bacon's 
claim and thereby enter an order more favorable to her when 
absolutely no facts were ever advanced by Ms. Bcicon in support of 
her hypothetical worker's compensation claim. For this reason, 
the notice pleading cases (Arrow Indus., Inc. v., Zion's First 
Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935 (Utah 1988); Freegard v. First Western 
Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614 (Utah 1987); and Christensen v. Lelis 
Automatic Transmission Service, Inc., 467 P.2d 605 (Utah 1970)) 
cited by Ms. Bacon on p. 11 of her brief have absolutely no 
bearing on the facts of the present case. 
Second, Ms. Bacon has mischaracterized the basis upon which 
the dismissal with prejudice is premised. The administrative law 
judge and the Industrial Commission did not enter the dismissal 
solely on the basis of Ms. Bacon's failure to state a definite 
claim. Quite to the contrary, it was the following combination 
of inaction and misconduct which led to the prejudicial 
dismissal: (1) Ms. Bacon and her attorney failed to specify any 
factual basis for the alleged worker's compensation claim in the 
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body of the Application for Hearing; (2) Ms. Bacon and her 
attorney failed to respond to the defendants' Motion for More 
Definite Statement which was filed concurrently with the 
defendants' Answer on November 14, 1991; (3) Ms. Bacon and her 
attorney completely failed to respond to the defendants' 
Interrogatories which were also filed on November 14, 1991; 
(4) Ms. Bacon and her attorney failed to respond to the 
administrative law judge's direct Order (entered November 22, 
1991) calling for the filing of an amended Application for 
Hearing setting forth the factual basis for Ms. Bacon's worker's 
compensation claim; (5) Ms. Bacon and her attorney failed to 
respond to or act in accordance with defense counsel's letter 
dated January 15, 1992 requesting the applicant's overdue 
response to the defendants' Interrogatories; and (6) Ms. Bacon 
and her attorney wholly failed to respond to the defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss filed on February 6, 1992. When the foregoing 
course of inactivity and misconduct is viewed in its totality, 
the Utah Court of Appeals should conclude that there was ample 
justification for the Industrial Commission's prejudicial 
dismissal of Ms. Bacon's worker's compensation claim. 
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POINT III 
WHETHER UTAH'S "OPEN COURTS" PROVISION GUARANTEES 
THAT A WORKER'S COMPENSATION CASE CAN NEVER 
BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE 
Ms. Bacon contends that the Open Courts provision of the 
Utah Constitution has somehow been violated by virtue of the 
Industrial Commission's dismissal of her worker's compensation 
claim. This contention is entirely erroneous when applied to the 
facts of this case. Ms. Bacon was afforded the full benefit of 
the Open Courts constitutional provision when she was permitted 
to file and prosecute her industrial claim pursuant to Utah's 
Workers' Compensation Act. The fact that her own inactivity and 
misconduct has now led to the prejudicial dismissal of her claim 
has absolutely nothing to do with a Open Courts analysis.5 To 
use Ms. Bacon's logic, any time an Industrial Commission or civil 
litigant is sanctioned and dismissed for failing to prosecute a 
claim or abide by a court order, that litigant has inherently 
suffered a violation of his or her constitutional right to the 
access of Utah's open courts. This position is nonsensical. A 
litigant's constitutional guarantee of access to open courts can 
only go so far. If the applicant abuses or mistreats his or her 
constitutional right, then he or she may suffer the forfeiture of 
5An Open Courts constitutional analysis arises when a statute 
(typically a statute of repose) operates to preclude or bar a 
litigant from filing her claim. See, Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985). No such statute is at 
issue in this case. 
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that right by virtue of a court order dismissing his or her 
claim. It is a tortuous argument, at best, for that litigant to 
then turn around and contend that his or her forfeiture of the 
right to prosecute his or her claim is somehow tantamount to a 
constitutional deprivation of his or her open courts right. 
Ms. Bacon is also mistaken in arguing that she will be left 
with no recourse should the Utah Court of Appeals uphold the 
dismissal with prejudice entered by the Industrial Commission. 
Indeed, according to her unilateral version of her course of 
dealing with her former attorney, she may well have a remedy 
against that attorney. In short, Ms. Bacon has been afforded the 
full benefit of her constitutional guarantee to the access of an 
open court, and that access is still wide open should she choose 
to proceed against her former attorney whom she claims so 
severely prejudiced her rights. 
POINT IV 
THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS DO NOT GUARANTEE 
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN NON-CRIMINAL CASES 
Ms. Bacons contention that her claim should be remanded 
because she was denied effective assistance of counsel during the 
administrative proceedings below is incorrect for two reasons. 
First, under Utah law, Ms. Bacon has no basis for asserting 
an ineffective assistance of counsel argument in the context of 
this Industrial Commission case. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
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expressly held that "ineffective assistance of counsel is a sixth 
Amendment right limited to criminal law." Richins v. Delbert, 
Chipman & Sons Co., Inc., 817 P.2d 382, 386, f.n. 2 (Utah App. 
1991). Pursuant to this legal standard, Ms. Bacon's claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit. Indeed, the 
Pennsylvania cases relied upon by Ms. Bacon on page 17 of her 
appellate Brief readily concur with the holding announced by this 
Court in Richins. In Bickel v. W. C. A. B., 538 A.2d 661 (Pa. 
Cmwlth. 1988) the Pennsylvania Court of Appeals explicitly stated 
that "the substantive due process right to effective assistance 
of counsel is not applicable to civil or administrative 
proceedings." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 663.6 Pursuant to both 
the Richins and Bickel standards, Ms. Bacon has no legal basis 
for asserting an ineffective assistance of counsel argument. 
Second, even if Ms. Bacon's ineffective assistance of 
counsel argument is legally proper, the argument fails due to Ms. 
Bacon's role in producing the dismissal with prejudice entered 
6The court in Bickel did decide that an examination of the 
effectiveness of a worker's attorney is relevant in the very narrow 
context of determining whether the Industrial Commission abused its 
discretion in refusing to allow the worker a rehearing of his 
claim. This narrow issue is not before the Utah Court of Appeals 
in the present case, because Ms. Bacon and her present appellate 
counsel never attempted to obtain a rehearing at any time during 
the Industrial Commission proceedings below. 
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below.7 At least three significant events, which occurred 
during Ms. Bacon's attempt to prosecute her worker's compensation 
claim, reveal that Ms. Bacon is as responsible as her former 
counsel for the dismissal with prejudice entered by the 
Industrial Commission. 
As this Court is aware, Ms. Bacon signed her Application for 
Hearing which is dated April 16, 1991. At the bottom of the 
Application for Hearing, printed in bold text, the Application 
indicates "UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILL BE RETURNED." In 
signing the Application, Ms. Bacon must be charged with the 
responsibility of ensuring (along with her attorney) the accuracy 
of the information contained in the Application. By leaving 
paragraph 2 of the Application completely blank, Ms. Bacon and 
her attorney were simply asking that the Industrial Commission 
reject the Application for Hearing. Any applicant genuinely 
7In the event the Utah Court of Appeals determines that it 
needs to review Ms. Bacon's course of conduct during the 
proceedings below, the Court should be aware of the following 
language from the California opinion cited on page 17 of 
appellant's Brief. In Orange Empire Nat'l Bank v. Kirk, 66 Cal. 
Rptr. 240, 244 (Cal. App. 1968) the court observed that: 
. . . the law ordinarily charges the client 
with the inexcusable neglect of his attorney, 
and gives him redress against his counsel 
[citations omitted], . . . [but only] the 
client who is relatively free from personal 
neglect will be relieved from a default or 
dismissal attributable to the inaction or 
procrastination of his counsel. [Citations 
omitted.] 
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concerned with the adequate prosecution her claim will at least 
go to the trouble of describing the accident which forms the 
basis of that claim. To suggest that an applicant who signs an 
Application for Hearing is not responsible for misrepresentations 
and omissions contained on the simple one-page form, is to 
suggest that the Industrial Commissions streamlined, user-
friendly process for initiating a worker's compensation claim is 
somehow overly burdensome. 
Even if Ms. Bacon was not apprised of the defendants' Motion 
for More Definite Statement (which was served on November 14, 
1991), Ms. Bacon at a minimum knew about Judge Allen's letter 
dated November 22, 1991 (attached hereto at Addendum "E"). Ms. 
Bacon took no action to either retain new counsel or ensure that 
the missing information in paragraph 2 of her Application for 
Hearing was filled in and provided to the Industrial Commission 
and the defendants. Ms. Bacon's own inactivity and carelessness 
in failing to respond to a direct Court Order has created the 
prejudice of which she now complains. 
It is also interesting to note that Ms. Bacon's Motion for 
Review (attached as Addendum "F") specifies that she was aware of 
the need to provide Interrogatory answers to the defendants but 
that she had difficulty in doing so as a result of her anxiety. 
While it is true that Ms. Bacon's attorney could have taken a 
number of steps in an attempt to keep her claim alive, it appears 
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that Ms. Bacon's failure to assist her attorney in responding to 
the defendants' Interrogatories caused the principal delay which 
ultimately led to the dismissal with prejudice. Ms. Bacon argues 
on page 16 of her brief that her attorney "failed for two months 
to furnish [her] with defense Interrogatories so that additional 
information could be obtained." This assertion, however, is not 
supported by the record on appeal. Ms. Bacon's own Motion for 
Review, filed on March 9, 1992, reveals that her former attorney 
had experienced persistent problems in obtaining cooperation and 
information from Ms. Bacon so that the Interrogatories could be 
answered. 
As with her open courts constitutional argument, Ms. Bacon 
is pointing a finger in the wrong direction when she contends 
that her worker's compensation claim should be remanded and 
adjudicated due to her allegation of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Quite to the contrary, if Ms. Bacon feels so strongly 
that her former counsel has caused the prejudice she has 
suffered, then her proper avenue of recourse is against that 
attorney. Indeed, this is the only course of action which should 
be sanctioned by the Utah Court of Appeals because the Court 
cannot engage in speculation in an attempt to ascertain the 
veracity of Ms. Bacon's ineffective assistance of counsel 
allegations. The Court can discern from the record, however, 
that Ms. Bacon failed to properly execute her Application for 
29 
Hearing at the time she signed it, failed to in any way respond 
to Judge Allen's November 22, 1991 Order, and apparently impeded 
her attorney's efforts to answer the defendants' Interrogatories. 
With these observations in hand, the Utah Court of Appeals 
can reject Ms. Bacon's ineffective assistance of counsel argument 
on any of three separate grounds. First, the argument has no 
basis in Utah law. Second, the issue was not preserved for 
appeal (Point I above). Or, third, the state of the factual 
record currently before the Court reveals that Ms. Bacon is at 
least as responsible as her own attorney for the dismissal with 
prejudice entered by the Industrial Commission. 
For each of the aforesaid reasons, appellees respectfully 
request that the dismissal entered by the Industrial Commission 
be upheld on appeal. 
DATED this 1 ^ day of C^^Q^t^- / 1992. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
MICHAELS. DYER 
MICHAEL A. PETERSO^ 
Attorneys for Appellees 
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ADDENDUM A 
Rule 37 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
their authenticity, to accept a copy of defen-
dant's written admissions served upon plaintiff 
as compliance with the rules; where the trial 
court chose the latter option, it was proper to 
permit plaintiff to recite defendant's admis-
sions into the record. Triple I Supply, Inc. v. 
Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982). 
—Failure to respond. 
Objectionable matter. 
Even if a request for an admission is objec-
tionable, if a party fails to object and fails to 
respond to the request, then that party should 
be held to have admitted the matter. Jensen v. 
Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 (Utah 
1985). 
Prison inmate. 
When inmate served requests for admissions 
and interrogatories on prison officials in action 
for recovery of value of personal property taken 
from him, on failure of officials to respond to 
the requests, apply for extension of time, or 
move to amend or withdraw their admissions 
pursuant to Subdivision (b), all the facts were 
deemed admitted and the inmate was entitled 
to judgment against the officials. Schmitt v. 
Billings, 600 P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
—Motion to dismiss. 
Tolling. 
Filing a motion to dismiss did not toll effect 
of Subdivision (a), which treats requests for ad-
missions which are not answered within 45 
days as if admitted and as a proper basis for 
summary judgment. Schmitt v. Billings, 600 
P.2d 516 (Utah 1979). 
—Punitive damages. 
Where plaintiff requests an admission of pu-
nitive damages in an amount unrelated to ac-
tual damages, the court, as a matter of equity, 
must intervene and examine the admission. 
Jensen v. Pioneer Dodge Ctr., Inc., 702 P.2d 98 
(Utah 1985). 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 14 Utah 2d 151, 
379 P.2d 379 (1963); W.W. & W.B. Gardner, 
Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 
(Utah 1977). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Depositions 
and Discovery §§ 314 to 325. 
C.J.S. — 27 C.J.S. Discovery §§ 88 to 110. 
A.L.R. — Continuance sought to secure tes-
timony of absent witness in civil case, admis-
sions to prevent, 15 A.L.R.3d 1272. 
Party's duty, under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 36(a) and similar state statutes and 
rules, to respond to request for admission of 
facts not within his personal knowledge, 20 
A.L.R.3d 756. 
Formal sufficiency of response to request for 
admissions under state discovery rules, 8 
A.L.R.4th 728. 
Permissible scope, respecting nature of in-
quiry, of demand for admissions under modern 
state civil rules of procedure, 42 A.L.R.4th 489. 
Key Numbers. — Discovery <s=> 121 to 129. 
Rule 37, Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanc-
tions. 
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable 
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order 
compelling discovery as follows: 
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be 
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating 
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being 
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall 
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken. 
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or 
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to 
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer 
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a 
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that 
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as 
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an 
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance 
106 
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the 
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination be-
fore he applies for an order. 
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such 
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion 
made pursuant to Rule 26(c), 
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision 
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer. 
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court 
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose 
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such 
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable ex-
penses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the 
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or 
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing, 
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of 
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reason-
able expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees, 
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially 
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may 
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion 
among the parties and persons in a just manner. 
(b) Failure to comply with order. 
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a 
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to 
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken, 
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court. 
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated 
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an 
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Sub-
division (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order 
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others 
the following: 
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made 
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the 
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party ob-
taining the order; 
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or 
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from intro-
ducing designated matters in evidence; 
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying fur-
ther proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or 
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default 
against the disobedient party; 
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an 
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders 
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination; 
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(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders 
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless 
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such 
person for examination. 
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court 
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising 
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, 
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substan-
tially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust. 
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness 
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if 
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the 
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order 
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in 
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make 
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant 
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or 
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might 
prevail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to 
admit. 
(d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to 
interrogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an 
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under 
Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before 
the officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper 
notice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under 
Rule 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written 
response to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper 
service of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may 
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may 
take any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision 
(b)(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall 
require the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the 
reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless 
the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other cir-
cumstances make an award of expenses unjust. 
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the 
ground that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to 
act has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c). 
(e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party 
or his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery 
plan by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportu-
nity for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party 
the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Compilers Notes. — This rule corresponds Cross-References. — Contempt generally, 
to Rule 37, F.R.C.P. § 78-32-1 et seq. 
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ing Workmen's Compensation Act. Ellis v. In- fees in same manner and with same limita-
dustrial Comm'n, 91 Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363 tions as it may review any other decision of the 
(1937). commission. Ellis v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 
Attorneys' fees in compensation cases should Utah 432, 64 P.2d 363 (1937); Thatcher v. In-
be measured according to the workingman's dustrial Comm'n, 115 Utah 568, 207 P.2d 
station. Ellis v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 Utah (1949). 
432, 64 P.2d 363 (1937). „ 
Suspension of attorney from practice. 
Review by Supreme Court. Attorney's indirect collection of fees from cli-
Industrial Commission not only has power to ents in excess of those awarded by Industrial 
fix attorneys' fees in cases before it, but it also Commission constituted unprofessional con-
has power to fix fees for services rendered on duct resulting in one year's suspension from 
review in Supreme Court, Supreme Court only practice. In re Hatch, 108 Utah 446, 160 P.2d 
having power to review matter of attorney's 961 (1945). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Attorney's Fees in or trying workmen's compensation claims or 
Utah, 1984 Utah L. Rev. 553. cases as practice of law, 2 A.L.R.2d 724. 
C.J.S. — 101 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensa- Key Numbers. — Workers' Compensation 
tion § 817. <§=> 1981. 
A.L.R. — Handling, preparing, presenting, 
35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure before commis-
sion and hearing examiner — Admissible evi-
dence. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be bound by the 
usual common-law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or for-
mal rules of procedure, other than as herein provided or as adopted by the 
commission pursuant to this act. The commission may make its investigation 
in such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substan-
tial rights of the parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workmen's 
Compensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in 
dispute all evidence deemed material and relevant including, but not limited 
to the following: 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings. 
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts 
or other records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 100, § 88; C.L. 1917, Meaning of "this act". — See same catch-
§ 3148; R.S. 1933 & C. 1943, 42-1-82; L. 1965, line in notes following § 35-1-46. 
ch. 67, § 1. Cross-References. — Rules for procedure of 
commission, § 35-1-10. 
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granted 0therwise, compensal • * • . .: >•.* ;,. • \ •-,* .% 
lowed. 
P. "Attending Physician's Statement — Form U4J 
— This form must be completed by employee and his 
last attending physician in the state to establish the 
medical condition of the employee. It must be accom-
panied by Form 044. 
Q. "Compensation Agreement — Form 019" — 
This form is used by the parties to a workers' compen-
sation claim to enter into an agreement as to a per-
manent partial impairment award, and must be sub-
mitted to the Commission for approval. 
R. "Application for Lump Sum or Advance Pay-
ment — Form 134" — This form is used by an em-
ployee to apply for a lump sum or advance payment 
for a permanent partial impairment award. 
S. "Release to Return to Work — Form 110" — 
This form may be used to meet the requirements of 
Rule R490-2-3E, as contained herein. 
T. "Insurance Carrier or Self-Insured Employer 
Annual Statement of Losses — Form 117" — Parts (a) 
and (b) are to be submitted together by January 31st 
for the preceding calendar year. Part (a), an individ-
ual loss claim log, states the losses by individual 
claim and part (b) states the aggregate losses by the 
insurance carrier or self-insured employer for the pre-
ceding calendar year. 
Carriers or self-insured employers wishing to sub-
mit a computer tape in lieu of the form must obtain 
prior written authorization from the Industrial Com-
mission, Industrial Accidents Division. 
U. "Disability Status Report — Form 206" — This 
report is required, as per Section 35-10-6, U.C.A., 
when an injured worker's temporary total compensa-
tion exceeds 90 days, or when it appears that the 
injured worker will be disabled, whichever comes 
first. The insurance carrier or the self-insured em-
ployer shall file this report with the Commission 
within 30 days thereafter. 
V. "Request for Copies From Claimant's File — 
Form 205" — This form is used to request copies from 
a claimant's file in the Industrial Commission with 
the appropriate authorized release. 
W. "Medical Records — Copies — Form 302" — 
This form is used by a claimant to request a free copy 
of his/her medical records from a medical provider. 
This form must be signed by a staff member of the 
Industrial Accidents Division. 
X. The Director of the Industrial Accidents Divi-
sion of the Commission may approve change of any of 
the above forms upon notice to all concerned parties. 
Carriers may print these forms or approved versions. 
R490-1-4. Pleadings and Discovery. 
A. For the purposes of Section 63-46b-3, U.C.A., all 
adjudicative proceedings for workers' compensation 
and occupational disease claims shall only be com-
menced by the injured worker or dependent filing a 
request for agency action with the Commission. The 
Administrative Law Judge is afforded discretion in 
allowing intervention of other parties pursuant to 
Section 63-46b-9, U.C.A. The Application for Hearing 
is the request for agency action. All such applications 
shall include supporting medical documentation of 
the claim where there is a dispute over medical is-
sues. Applications without supporting documentation 
will not be mailed to the employer or insurance car-
rier for answer until the appropriate documents have 
been provided. 
B. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is 
denied by an employer or insurance carrier, the bur-
den rests on the applicant to initiate the action by 
t, *::. Mii>iu;i in for Hearing with the Commis-
sion 
L/. Wnen an Application for Hearing is filed with 
the Commission, the Commission shall forthwith 
mail a copy to the employer or to the employer's in-
surance carrier. 
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 30 
days following the date of the mailing of the applica-
tion to file a written answer with the Industrial Com-
mission, admitting or denying liability for the claim. 
The answer should state all affirmative defenses with 
sufficient accuracy and detail that an applicant may 
be fully informed of the * nature of the defense as-
serted. All answers shall include a summary and cat-
egorization of benefits paid to date on the claim. A 
copy shall be sent to the applicant or, if there is one, 
to the applicant's attorney by the defendant. 
E. When an employer or insurance carrier fails to 
file an answer within the 30 days provided above, the 
Commission may enter a default against such em-
ployer or insurance carrier. The Commission may 
then set the matter for hearing, take evidence bear-
ing on the claim, and enter an Order based on the 
evidence presented. Such defaults may be set aside by 
following the procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Said default shall apply to the defen-
dant employer or insurance carrier and shall not be 
construed to deprive the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund or the Uninsured Employers' Fund of any ap-
propriate defenses. 
F. Where the answer denies liability solely on the 
medical aspects of the case, the applicant, through 
his/her attorney or agent, and the employer or insur-
ance carrier, with the approval of the Commission or 
its representative, may enter into a stipulated set of 
facts, which stipulation, together with the medical 
documents bearing on the case in the Commission's 
file, may be used in making the final determination 
of liability. 
G. When deemed appropriate, the Commission or 
its representatives may have a pre-hearing or post 
hearing conference. 
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may 
commence discovery with appropriate sets of inter-
rogatories. Such discovery should focus on the acci-
dent event, witnesses, as well as past and present 
medical care. The defendant shall also be entitled to 
appropriately signed medical releases to allow gath-
ering of pertinent medical records. The defendant 
may also require the applicant to submit to an inde-
pendent medical examination to be conducted by a 
physician of the defendant's choice. Failure of an ap-
plicant to comply with such requests may result in 
the dismissal of a claim or a delay in the scheduling 
of a hearing. 
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all 
discovery proceedings and must be signed, unless 
good cause is shown for a shorter period, at least one 
week prior to any scheduled hearing. 
J. All medical records shall be filed by the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier as a single joint exhibit 
at least one week before the scheduled hearing. 
Claimant must cooperate and submit all pertinent 
medical records contained in his file to the employer 
or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit submis-
sion two weeks in advance of a scheduled hearing. 
Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed binder 
arranged by care provider in chronological order. Ex-
hibits should include all relevant treatment records 
with the exception of hospital nurses notes. 
K. The Administrative Law Judge must be notified 
one week in advance of any proceeding where it is 
anticipated that more than four witnesses will be 
called, or where it is anticipated that the hearing of 
the evidence will require more than two hours. 
L. Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudi-
cative proceeding will be issued in accordance with 
the provisions of Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10, 
U.C.A. 
M. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding seek-
ing review of an Order by the Agency may file a writ-
ten request for review in accordance with the provi-
sions of Sections 63-46b-12,13,14,15, and 16, U.C.A. 
A Motion for Review of any order entered by an Ad-
ministrative Law Judge may be filed pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A. Unless so 
filed, the Order will become the award of the Com-
mission and will be final. If appropriately filed, the 
Administrative Law Judge may: 
1. Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Or-
der after holding such further hearing and receiving 
such further evidence as may be deemed necessary, 
2. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supple-
mental order, or 
3. Refer the entire case to the Commission for re-
view under Section 35-1-82.53, U.C.A. 
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supple-
mental Order, as provided above, it shall be final un-
less a Motion for Review of the same is filed with the 
Commission. 
N. In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Indus-
trial Commission shall generally follow the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure regarding discovery and the 
issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure are modified by the express provi-
sions of Section 35-1-88, U.C.A., or as may be other-
wise modified by the presiding officer. 
0 . A request for reconsideration of a Commission's 
Order on Motion for Review may be allowed and shall 
be governed by the provisions of Section 63-46b-13, 
U.C.A. Any petition for judicial review of the Com-
mission's Order on Motion for Review shall be gov-
erned by the provisions of Section 63-46b-14, U.C.A. 
R490-1-5. Al lowance for Mail ing. 
A. Whenever a notice or other paper requiring or 
permitting some action on behalf of a party is served 
on a party by mail, three days shall be added to the 
prescribed period as allowed under Rule 6 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. This three day extension 
does not apply to notices sent by registered mail as 
required by Sections 35-1-46(3) and 35-1-46.30(2), 
U.C.A. 
R490-1-6. Business Hours. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-9, U.C.A., the office of the 
Commission shall be open for receipt of official docu-
ments during business hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. 
Any official document received after 5:00 p.m. shall 
be considered received on the next working day. 
R490-1-7. Attorney Fees . 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-87, U.C.A., the Commis-
sion adopts the following procedure to regulate and 
fix the fees for attorneys representing applicants be-
fore the Commission: 
A. The concept of a contingency fee is recognized. 
However, a retainer in advance of a Commission ap-
proved fee will not be allowed. 
B. In allowing the following amounts, the schedule 
presupposes a hearing based upon issues which re-
sults in a written Order by the Administrative Law 
Judge. Some discretion may be used by the Adminis-
trative Law Judge to vary from the following if the 
result would be unconscionable to either the worker 
or his/her attorney. 
1. 20% of weekly compensation generated for the 
first $15,000. 
2. 15% of the weekly compensation generated in 
excess of $15,000 but not exceeding $30,000. 
3. 10% of the weekly compensation generated in 
excess of $30,000. 
4. In no case shall an attorney collect fees calcu-
lated on more than the first six years of any and all 
combinations of workers' compensation awards. 
5. Attorney fees shall be allowed only when com-
pensation is generated by the attorney. There shall 
be no attorney fees awarded for medical claims. 
6. When an attorney takes an employee's case to 
the Court of Appeals and/or Supreme Court, and pre-
vails, a fee will be determined in addition to the 
above schedule. 
7. In all cases where settlement or admission of 
liability is obtained prior to a hearing, or where assis-
tance is provided in preparing and filling out forms or 
making contacts with defendants or other services — 
short of a hearing — the usual and customary hourly 
charges for the attorney may be approved. However, 
all such charges must be approved by the Commis-
sion or one of its Administrative Law Judges prior to 
payment. Reasonable proof and documentation of ad-
ditional gain of compensation by an attorney shall be 
provided to an Administrative Law Judge when re-
quested. 
R490-1-8. Witness Fees. 
Each witness who shall appear before the Commis-
sion by its order shall receive from the Commission 
for his/her attendance fees and mileage as provided 
for witnesses by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Otherwise, each party is required to subpoena wit-
nesses at their own expense, 
R490-1-9. Guidel ines for Utilization of Medical 
Panel . 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commis-
sion adopts the following guidelines in determining 
the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue must 
be shown by conflicting medical reports. Significant 
medical issues are involved when there are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physi-
cal impairment which vary more than 5% of the 
whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the tempo-
rary total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days, 
and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to 
more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may 
be scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel 
report. Where there is a proffer of new written con-
flicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law 
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the new 
evidence to the panel for consideration and clarifica-
tion. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize 
an injured worker to be examined by another physi-
cian for the purpose of obtaining a further medical 
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical 
issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing 
these medical issues in all cases where: 
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Applicant (Employee) 
• • » 
Employer 
• • *» 
* 
,» » » . - + • « 
.„ i « » - » 
J '1 » * * 
APPLICATION FOR HEARING 
Employees Street Address 
C i ty /S ta te /Z ip 
U / ./ tX S * t/ > /? St.(v-ti-t f C-JC -* 
* 
* 
» » 
Employers' Insurance Carrier * 
APPLICANT ALLEGES AND REQUESTS RESOLUTION CONCERNING THE FOLLOWING UNDER TITLE 35: 
1. * I sustained an injury by accident arising out of ir in the course of employment wi 
Defendant (employer) on the day of ) 19 '7/ 
Location (Give name & complete address or nearest junction, mile marker, etc.) 
2. The accident, ocurred as fol 1 ows: (Describe accident and result ing injuries ) _ 
The injury • :aused temporary total disability from 1-P7 - 91 to £, •*•>'* w ~ 
Compensation has been paid for the following period(s)i 
period(s) of time paid, and the last payment date) />*/LC 
Date fi rst off Date Return 
(Indicate weekly amoun 
This Claim is filed because 
A. 
B. 
C, 
D. 
(Please mark an X in the appropriate space(s)) 
v Defendants have refused payment of medical expenses. 
X Compensation has not been paid for any/all periods of time off work. 
Defendants have denied liability for permanent partial disability. 
I am claiming Additional temporary total disability; additi.on.il 
medical benefits; additional permanent partial disability 
E _ _ I am claiming permanent total disability. 
F, _____ Other Reason (specify) _ _ _ _ _ 
IN ADDITION, THE CLAIMANT ALLEGES; (Please fill in or mark appropriate blank) 
6, My date of birth is T~ ? - ^» . My wage at the time of injury was $ ft */7 
::ar nou: _/day_ / week / month working Q0 hours per week C 
(specify method of payment)_ 
I was /was not married and had 
children under age 18 dependent on me for support. 
Dat .e U- / ^ c?' 
^ ' •" ,
 l
 7. / ; , / , 
V V - / » 1 ' <-
Printed name of-^Applicant 
uy\g ( Maccy^ 
Printed Name of Attorney Signature of Applicant 
/ 2 ^ > ^ • :l h J • 
Signature of Attorney Street Address of Applicant: 
Street address & Office - Attorney 
City/State/Zip ~~~ Telephone 
City/State/Zip of Applicant 
yiv-j-f> / <*?2-cy~/7/? 
Applicant's Telephone Social Security # 
UNSIGNED OR INCOMPLETE FORMS WILI BE RETURNED 
^ T P \T A *T* T f TO V V' n V13 *F T I? V O O » r\ "I % T t » r\ i :» "i » t r» m t », r t * • *r» i i x. % T • » « » • «. • - - - •—• — — — - - — - V \*&
 (
'"1 
HEARING PREPARATION INSTRUCTIONS 
• • • a • 
• - • • • • • - , • • • - - • • 
• • • * • » • » * • - • • • • • •-
» * " a s * r — • • » » • • • • • 
(1) Fcnt'p.l *\, not ices ^ of your hearing d^t^ will J)e mail£t| upon the Commission 
receiving a formal written denial of your claim b^ the DeYerfdants. 
(2) Cases must? *be* completely prepared before*; the hearing. You should 
therefore begin
 3iiamediately to prepare your caSe0; All necessary witnesses, 
documents and medidal reports must be read^**at* - the hearing. Physicians 
normally supply copies of all medical reports to the Commission. However, the 
parties should verify that all medical reports have been submitted to our 
office prior to the hearing. 
(3) Hearing notices will be mailed sufficiently in advance of your hearing to 
allow your adjusting appointments, getting time off work or clearing your 
calendar of any conflicts with the hearing date, 
(A) The employee must know the exact dates that he has lost from work 
because of his injury. 
(5) Witnesses are needed only to prove issues which are in dispute. If 
requested, subpoenas will be issued, but service of subpoenas must be arranged 
for and witness fees paid by the party making the request. 
(6) It is optional with the employee whether he desires to be represented by 
an attorney, or not. In many cases an employee is at a disadvantage without 
advice and representation of expert counsel. The fees of attorneys 
representing an employee, or his/her dependent, will be fixed by the 
Commission. The fees are limited to 20% of the compensation award, exclusive 
of medical expenses. 
(7) If you are not represented by an attorney and are in doubt as to what to 
do, communicate with the office of the Industrial Commission of Utah. When 
writing, always refer to the case by date of injury and the name of the 
insured employee and his/her employer. Please notify this Commission of any 
changes in your address following your initial application. 
(8) If the claim is for additional compensation and/or medical benefits, the 
matter will not be set for hearing until a current medical report from the 
treating physician has be^n filed with the Commission indicating: 
a. The present disability is greater than the prior rating given 
and is due to the accident stated in paragraph (1) on the other 
side, and/or 
b. Additional medical treatment and/or hospitalization is required 
because of the accident stated in paragraph (1) on the other 
side. 
ADDENDUM E 
N o r m a n H. B a n g u r t e r 
Ciovernor 
Timothy C. Allen 
Presiding Administrative Law Judge 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
ADJUDICATION DIVISION 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 510250 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84151 -0250 (801) 530-6800 November 22 , 1991 
(801) 530-6804 (Fax) 
Sloven M. Hadloy 
Chairman 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
Dixie L. Minson 
Commissioner 
Randy M Lish 
Attorney at Law 
93 0 South State #10 
Orem UT 84058 
Re: Jamie Bacon 
Inj: 01-17-91 
Emp: IPP Service Center 
Dear Mr Lish: 
Our office is in receipt of an answer to the Application for 
Hearing filed in the above matter. In reviewing the file, I note 
that it will be necessary for you to provide a more definite 
statement regarding what happened on January 17, 1991. Please be 
advised that no hearing will be scheduLed in this matter until our 
office receives this information. 
Please feel free to contact me if I can be of any assistance 
in this matter. 
BY DIRECTION: 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
TCA/mm 
ren 
re Law Judge 
cc: Jamie Bacon, 1235 West Main, Delta UT 84624 
Michael Dyer, Atty, P O Box 2465, SLC UT 84110-2465 
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MOTION FOR REVIEW 
RANDY M. LISH (3823) 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
Attorneys for Applicant 
930 South State Street, Suite 10 
Orem, Utah 84058 
Telephone: (801) 224-2119 
—BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH— 
Case No. 4/s>(9/6 i? 
OOOOOOO 
JAIME BACON, 
Applicant, 
vs. 
INTERMOUNTAIN POWER SERVICE 
CORPORATION and WAUSAU 
INSURANCE COMPANIES, 
Defendants. 
oooOooo 
COMES NOW the applicant, Jaime Bacon, and submits her Motion 
for Review of the Commission's Order of Dismissal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On November 22, 1991, Defendants requested a more 
definite statement of the nature of the injury to the applicant and 
how it occurred. Interrogatories were also served on applicant on 
November 14, 1991. 
2. In attempting to verify the necessary recital of facts 
from the applicant, applicant's attorney found that reviewing the 
details of the series of incidents leading up to applicant's injury 
caused applicant serious distress (see exhibit "A"). Applicant 
jllough, Jones, 
& Ivins 
South State St 
Suite 10 
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28 
iliough, Jones, 
& Ivins 
South State St. 
Suite 10 
finally did inform her attorney that she had filed a complete 
statement with the claims adjuster for Wausau, Mr. Jim Lloyd. 
Applicant's attorney contacted Mr. Lloyd by phone on January 9*
 F 
1992, as soon as he learned of the report, to request it be 
released. Mr. Lloyd assured applicant's attorney that he would 
contact his company's attorney as soon as he returned to the office 
the following Monday. 
3. Applicant's attorney contacted Defendant's attorney's 
office and left a message requesting said attorney contact him upon 
returning to his office. To date, applicant's attorney has not 
been able to obtain a copy of the statement of facts given to the 
adjuster. 
ARGUMENT 
Applicant's claim is for job-induced stress. In reciting 
numerous times the specific incidents giving rise to the 
applicant's inability to continue working, applicant has undergone 
serious stress attacks (see exhibit "A"). Applicant's attorney has 
attempted to obtain information already provided to one of 
Defendants' employees in order to alleviate added stress to 
applicant, but has been unsuccessful. It is applicant's contention 
that the matter should not be dismissed considering that defendants 
have a full statement of the details of the incidents leading up to 
applicant's disability in their possession, and Applicant's 
response is included with this response to the motion. 
"*"255^r*' 
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Applicant has not intentionally ignored the Industrial 
Commission's requests, nor those of the Defendants, but has 
suffered severe stress in trying to verify for her attorney the 
specific details needed for the responses requested. Based on the 
circumstances of applicant, and the attempts to provide Defendants 
with the requested information, Applicant requests that the 
Commission reconsider its decision to dismiss Applicant's claim. 
DATED this 9_ day of March, 1992. 
MCCULLOUGH, JONES & IVINS 
fo&^Jsfr / ^ 
16 II Randy ^M. L i s h 
A t t o r n e y f o r A p p l i c a n t 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion for Review by first-class mail, postage prepaid, 
this '/r* day of March, 1992, to Michael E. Dyer, Attorney for 
Defendants, Key Bank Tower, Suite 700, 50 South Main Street, P.O. 
Box 2465, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-2465. 
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